

#### Lessons V and VI: Overview

- 1. FX parity conditions
- 2. Do the PPP and the IRPs (CIRP and UIRP) hold in practice?



# FX parity conditions



# FX parity conditions

- 1. The Law of One Price and the Purchasing Power Parity
- 2. The Covered Interest Rate Parity
- 3. The Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
- 4. The Fisher-open condition
- 5. The Forward Rate Unbiased



# The usefulness of parity conditions

Parity conditions should be thought of as "break- even values", where the decisionmaker is indifferent between two available strategies

Parity conditions rely heavily on arbitrage  $\rightarrow$  violations of parities may give rise to profit opportunities, that would be exploited and reabsorbed in a very short span of time.



## The Law of One Price I

*Ceteris paribus*, the price of a product, when converted into a common currency using the spot exchange rate, is the same in every country.

$$P_{iD} = S_{(D/F)} \cdot P_{iF}$$

with  $i = i^{th}$  product



# Law of One Price II

Delving with the ceteris paribus condition

There must be no frictions for the LOP to hold, meaning no legal restrictions on the movement of goods, no transportation costs and no tariffs.



#### The LOP and the Big Mac I

#### A feast of burgernomics

The Big Mac index

	Big Mac prices		Implied	Actual dollar	Under (-)/over (+)
	In local currency	in dollars	PPP* of the dollar	exchange rate Jan 31st	valuation against the dollar, %
United States†	\$3.22	3.22			
Argentina	Peso 8.25	2.65	2.56	3.11	-18
Australia	A\$3.45	2.67	1.07	1.29	-17
Brazil	Real 6.4	3.01	1.99	2.13	-6
Britain	£1.99	3.90	1.62‡	1.96‡	+21
Canada	C\$3.63	3.08	1.13	1.18	-4
Chile	Peso 1,670	3.07	519	544	-5
China	Yuan 11.0	1.41	3.42	7.77	-56
Colombia	Peso 6,900	3.06	2,143	2,254	-5
Costa Rica	Colones 1,130	2.18	351	519	-32
Czech Republic	Koruna 52.1	2.41	16.2	21.6	-25
Denmark	DKr27.75	4.84	8.62	5.74	+50
Egypt	Pound 9.09	1.60	2.82	5.70	-50
Estonia	Kroon 30	2.49	9.32	12.0	-23
Euro area§	€2.94	3.82	1.10**	1.30**	+19
Hong Kong	HK\$12.0	1.54	3.73	7.81	-52
Hungary	Forint 590	3.00	183	197	-7
Iceland	Kronur 509	7.44	158	68.4	+131
Indonesia	Rupiah 15,900	1.75	4,938	9,100	-46
Japan	¥280	2.31	87.0	121	-28
Latvia	Lats 1.35	2.52	0.42	0.54	-22
Lithuania	Litas 6.50	2.45	2.02	2.66	-24
Malaysia	Ringgit 5.50	1.57	1.71	3.50	-51
Mexico	Peso 29.0	2.66	9.01	10.9	-17

#### A feast of burgernomics

The Big Mac index

	Big Mac	Big Mac prices		Actual dollar	Under (-)/over (+)
	In local	in	Implied PPP* of	exchange rate	valuation against
New Zealand	NZ\$4.60	3.16	1.43	1.45	-2
Norway	Kroner 41.5	6.63	12.9	6.26	+106
Pakistan	Rupee 140	2.31	43.5	60.7	-28
Paraguay	Guarani 10,000	1.90	3,106	5,250	-41
Peru	New Sol 9.50	2.97	2.95	3.20	-8
Philippines	Peso 85.0	1.74	26.4	48.9	-46
Poland	Zloty 6.90	2.29	2.14	3.01	-29
Russia	Rouble 49.0	1.85	15.2	26.5	-43
Saudi Arabia	Riyal 9.00	2.40	2.80	3.75	-25
Singapore	S\$ 3.60	2.34	1.12	1.54	-27
Slovakia	Crown 57.98	2.13	18.0	27.2	-34
South Africa	Rand 15.5	2.14	4.81	7.25	-34
South Korea	Won 2,900	3.08	901	942	-4
Sri Lanka	Rupee 190	1.75	59.0	109	-46
Sweden	SKr32.0	4.59	9.94	6.97	+43
Switzerland	SFr6.30	5.05	1.96	1.25	+57
Taiwan	NT\$75.0	2.28	23.3	32.9	-29
Thailand	Baht 62.0	1.78	19.3	34.7	-45
Turkey	Lire 4.55	3.22	1.41	1.41	nil
UAE	Dirhams 10.0	2.72	3.11	3.67	-15
Ukraine	Hryvnia 9.00	1.71	2.80	5.27	-47
Uruguay	Peso 55.0	2.17	17.1	25.3	-33
Venezuela	Bolivar 6,800	1.58	2,112	4,307	-51

Sources: McDonald's; The Economist \*F †Average of

n/st \*Purchasing-power parity: local price divided by price in United States †Average of New York, Atlanta, Chicago and San Francisco ‡Dollars per pound §Weighted average of prices in euro area \*\*Dollars per euro

Source: The Economist, 2007



# The LOP and the Big Mac II



- 1. Which is the most overvalued currency? Why?
- 2. Which is the most undervalued currency? Why?



# The Purchasing Power Parity I

If the LOP were to hold for a certain basket of goods and services, we get the **Purchasing Power Parity** relation (in **absolute** or **static form**):

$$P_D = S(D/F) \cdot P_F$$

with P = price index of the underlying basket of goods/services

The CIRP applies to financial markets: the PPP can be conceived as a parallel parity condition referring to the products market.



# The Purchasing Power Parity II

Based on the PPP condition, it must be that:

$$S_{PPP} = \frac{P_D}{P_F}$$

- 1. Whenever  $S_{D/F} > S_{PPP} \rightarrow$  the domestic currency (D) is undervalued/ the foreign currency (F) is overvalued;
- 2. Whenever  $S_{D/F} < S_{PPP} \rightarrow$  the domestic currency (D) is overvalued/ the foreign currency (F) is undervalued



# The Purchasing Power Parity III

In practice, however, it is difficult to test the validity of PPP in absolute form.

Different baskets of goods are used in different countries to compute price indexes, given that tastes and needs differ on an international scale, affecting what people buy.



## The Purchasing Power Parity IV

Price levels could be substituted with inflations rates

PPP in relative or dynamic terms



Dealing with algebra I  
Suppose that at t<sub>0</sub>:  

$$P_D = S(D/F) \cdot P_F$$
  
In 1 year's time, it will be:  
 $P_D(1+\Delta P_D) = S(D/F)(1+\Delta S_D/F) \cdot P_F(1+\Delta P_F)$   
Divide the latter by the former and get:

 $(1 + \Delta P_D) = (1 + \Delta S_D / F) \cdot (1 + \Delta P_F)$ 






Rearranging the terms:  $\Delta S_{D/F} = \frac{(1 + \Delta P_D)}{(1 + \Delta P_F)} - 1$ 

Or, equivalently:

$$\Delta S_{D/F} = \frac{(\Delta P_D - \Delta P_F)}{(1 + \Delta P_F)}$$







# Terminology



# From the PPP to the real FX rate

The real interest rate can be defined as:

$$q_{(D/F)} = \frac{S_{(D/F)} \cdot P_F}{P_D}$$

 $q_{(D/F)}$  is a broad summary measure of the prices of one country's goods and services relative to the prices of another's.



#### The real exchange rate I

Consider the \$/€ real FX rate

$$q(\$/\epsilon) = \frac{S(\$/\epsilon) \cdot P\epsilon}{P\$}$$


 $q_{\$/€}$  can be conceived as the USD price of European products (goods and services) in terms of American products.

Whenever q<sub>\$/€</sub> increases/decreases→ real depreciation/appreciation of the USD against the EUR (i.e. fall/increase of the purchasing power of a \$ within Europe's borders)



#### The real exchange rate II

$$q(\$/\epsilon) = \frac{S(\$/\epsilon) \cdot P_{\epsilon}}{P_{\$}}$$





#### From the CIRP to the UIRP

$$(1+r_D)^n = \frac{F({}_{nD}/F)}{S({}_{D}/F)}(1+r_F)^n$$

As long as  $F(_{nD/F}) = S^{E}(_{D/F})$  (assuming, as usual, risk neutrality and zero transaction costs)...




## The UIRP

$$(1+r_D)^n = \frac{S^E({}_{nD/F})}{S({}_{D/F})}(1+r_F)^n$$


**Uncovered interest rate parity**: the mathematical expression is almost analogous to the one used for CIRP, apart from the fact that foreign exchange exposure is not covered with a forward exchange contract.



# Playing with UIRP I










# Combining PPP and UIRP If we combine $\Delta S^{E} = r_{D} - r_{F}$ and $\Lambda S^{E} = \Lambda P^{E} D - \Lambda P^{E} F$ we get $r_D - \Delta P^E_D = r_F - \Delta P^E_F$



#### The Fisher-open condition


$$r_D - \Delta P^E_D = r_F - \Delta P^E_F$$

**Fisher-open condition:** real interest rates are equal in different countries.






#### The UIRP, the PPP and the Fisheropen condition









# Do the PPP and the IRPs (CIRP and UIRP) hold in practice?



# Does PPP hold in practice?

Testing the validity of PPP may be troublesome as a consequence of:

- 1. Different baskets of goods underlying the price index;
- 2. Non tradable goods;
- 3. Transaction costs (quotas, tariffs, duties);
- 4. Different consumers' preferences→ Different price indexes' weighting schemes;
- 5. Oligopolistic markets



### Testing the validity of PPP: statistical evidence I

Given the following regression model

$$\Delta\% S_t = \alpha + \beta(\Delta\% P_{Dt} - \Delta\% P_{Ft}) + \mathcal{E}_t$$

If PPP held, it would have to be:

- $\alpha \rightarrow$  (statistically) not significantly different from 0;
- $\beta \rightarrow$  (statistically) not significantly different from 1;
- **R**<sup>2</sup> sufficiently "high"



#### Testing the validity of PPP: statistical evidence II

Dependent Variable: Method: Least Square Date: 02/03/12 Time Sample: 1997M02 20 Included observations	es e: 07:05 011M12			
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
US_EU_INFL C	-0.383674 0.001007	0.614007 0.002316	-0.624869 0.434942	
R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood Durbin-Watson stat	0.002201 -0.003436 0.030934 0.169372 369.2026 1.901255	Mean depen S.D. depend Akaike info Schwarz crit F-statistic Prob(F-statistic	lent var criterion erion	0.000920 0.030881 -4.102822 -4.067209 0.390461 0.532862

#### $Y = S_{\text{s/e}}, X = \Delta \% P_{\text{s}} - \Delta \% P_{\text{e}}$ and $P_{\text{e}} = EU27$ HICP price index




#### Testing the validity of PPP: statistical evidence III

The emerging empirical evidence suggests that:

- PPP performs poorly in the short run;
- Prices seem to revert to their PPP levels in the long run→ mean reverting processes;
- The speed of adjustment towards the PPP level is a positive function of the size of the deviation;
- PPP deviations may be permanent if a permanent real shock affects one country but not the other







#### PPP deviations and the Balassa-Samuelson effect I

The PPP states that, when expressed in terms of a single currency, countries' price levels should approximately equate.

The empirical evidence, however, suggests that countries' price levels are positively related to (per capita) real income dynamics (i.e. prices tend to be higher in richer countries)

**Balassa-Samuelson effect** 




#### PPP deviations and the Balassa-Samuelson effect II

<u>Poor countries</u>: the labor force is less productive in the tradables sector (whilst international productivity differences in nontradables are negligible)  $\rightarrow$  lower productivity implies lower wages, which further imply lower production costs and, consequently, lower price levels.

The Balassa-Samuelson effect can help explain (apparent) persistent deviations from PPP




#### PPP deviations and the Balassa-Samuelson effect III





#### PPP deviations and the Balassa-Samuelson's effect IV





# Does CIRP hold in practice?

Very closely, but not exactly as a consequence of:

- 1. Execution risk
- 2. Transaction costs
- 3. Political risk
- 4. Tax advantages
- 5. Liquidity differences



The CIRP and the execution risk

There might be time lags during execution, thus implying some extra risk  $\rightarrow$  placing orders takes time and market prices may change

This tends to create a "band" around the CIRP line



# The CIRP and the transaction costs

Transaction costs do <u>not always</u> contribute to deviations from IRP

Round-trip arbitrages tend to create a "band" around the CIRP line, whilst oneway arbitrages do not (Lesson II)



## The CIRP & the political risk I

Political risk involves the uncertainty that while funds are invested in a foreign country, they may be frozen (they cannot be repatriated), confiscated or even made incovertible into other currencies.

Investors typically require a risk premium from foreign investments versus domestic investments



## The CIRP & the political risk II

Political risk creates a "band" around the CIRP line.

The band does not have to be of equal width on the two sides of the CIRP line, if one country is seen as riskier than the other.



### The CIRP and tax dynamics

As long as tax rates depend on the country in which funds are borrowed/invested, the interest parity condition will be affected.

Two ways in which taxes can affect the parity condition:

- 1. Withholding taxes;
- 2. Differences between the tax rate on income  $(\tau_{I})$  and the tax rate on capital gains  $(\tau_{K})$



## Withholding tax

Withholding tax: tax applied to foreigners at the source of their earnings.

Withholding taxes are unlikely to create any "band" around the parity line **iff** the **rate of withholding**  $\leq$  the tax **rate** that would be **applied to the earnings at home**, since domestic withholding tax credits (purposely designed to avoid double taxation) will offset the tax withheld.



#### Income vs K gains taxation I

$$r_{\$} - r_{\pounds} = \frac{1 - \tau_{K}}{1 - \tau_{I}} \left[ \frac{F_{1\$/\pounds} - S_{\$/\pounds}}{S_{\$/\pounds}} \right] (1 + r_{\pounds})$$

 $\frac{1-\tau_K}{1-\tau_I} > 1$ 

As long as  $\tau_{\rm K} < \tau_{\rm I}$ ,

Investors (borrowers) with favorable capital gains treatment will prefer investments denominated in currencies trading at a forward premium (discount)



#### Income vs K gains taxation II

If  $\tau_{\text{Capital Gains}} \neq \tau_{\text{Interest Income}}$ , the slope of the CIRP line may be affected.

After taxes, if capital gains taxes are paid on foreign exchange earnings, even when hedged, the investor will receive only  $(1 - \tau_{\text{Interest Income}})$  of the interest and  $(1 - \tau_{\text{Capital Gains}})$  of the gain from the forward premium (considered as a K gain)



## The CIRP and liquidity differences I

Liquidity refers to how easily, quickly and cheaply an asset can be converted into cash.

Suppose the funds put in a covered foreign investments are needed earlier  $\rightarrow$  the investor might incur in potential losses when monetizing the original investment



# The CIRP and liquidity differences II

Liquidity preference is likely to create a band around the covered interest-parity line.

The potential width of the band due to liquidity preference depends on the likelihood that the funds will be needed earlier.



#### Does the CIRP hold in practice?

Empirically, the CIRP seems to hold:

- in the eurocurrency market;
- for short term lending/borrowing.



### Testing the validity of UIRP: statistical evidence I

Given the following regression model

$$\Delta\% S_t = \alpha + \beta(r_{Dt} - r_{Ft}) + \mathcal{E}_t$$

If UIRP held, it would have to be:

- $\alpha \rightarrow$  (statistically) not significantly different from 0;
- $\beta \rightarrow$  (statistically) not significantly different from 1;
- **R**<sup>2</sup> sufficiently "high"



#### Testing the validity of UIRP: statistical evidence II

Dependent Variable: E Method: Least Square Date: 02/03/12 Time Sample: 2000M01 20 Included observations	es — : 15:35 11M12	ANC I		
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
IUSA_EU C	0.051431	0.067659 0.000584	0.760148 1.306393	
R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression Sum squared resid Log likelihood Durbin-Watson stat	0.004053 -0.002961 0.006986 0.006930 511 4719 1 550228	Mean depen S.D. depend Akaike info Schwarz crit F-statistic Prob(F-statis	lent var criterion terion	0.000793 0.006976 -7.075999 -7.034751 0.577825 0.448426



#### Testing the validity of UIRP: statistical evidence III

The empirical evidence reveals that the UIRP holds poorly in the short run.

- Whenever short term interest rates are high, currencies tend to appreciate;
- "Carry trade" strategies are profitable in the short run;
- Basket carry trade strategies perform even better



## Terminology



**Carry trade** 

Trading strategy consisting in selling a relatively low interest rate currency and using the funds to purchase another yielding a higher interest rate.



## To put it into practice

Choose a couple of countries (excluding the EU and the USA) and test whether the PPP and the UIRP are supported by the available empirical evidence or not.