

# Growth and the business cycle

Lecture 1

# The determinants of growth and business cycles theories

Economics: **An inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations** (Adam Smith)

- The determinants of growth in the long run
  - **“Nothing matters more to the long term economic welfare of a nation than its rate of economic growth:** compounded over many years, seemingly small differences in annual growth rates can lead to vast differences in standards of living” (Robert Barro)
- The theory of fluctuations in aggregate economic activity (**an inquiry into the causes and dynamics of Business Cycles**):
  - Classical theory
  - Keynesian theory
  - Monetarist theory
  - Real Business Cycle Theory
  - Fisher-Minsky theory

# The determinants of growth in the long run: the Solow-Swan (neoclassical) growth model

- **Factor endowments:**
  - **Land and natural resources** available (R), assumed fixed
  - **Labour** employed (N)
  - **Capital** (K)
    - Physical (factories, infrastructure)
    - Human (education)
    - Institutional (rule of law, institutions, etc.)

$$Y = f ( R, N, K )$$
$$dY = f'_n dn + f'_k dk + TFP$$

## In the traditional neoclassical framework **Growth** depends on:

- Increase in labour employed or increase in labour productivity
- Increase in capital employed or increase in capital productivity
- *Key assumption: labour and capital are subject to diminishing returns in a closed economy*
- **The rate of capital accumulation determines the rate of economic growth**
- A country with a higher saving rate will experience faster growth, since it will have faster capital accumulation
- Conditional convergence: a “poor” country, with less capital per worker (relative to its long run or steady state capital per worker) will grow faster and therefore “catch up” with “richer” countries
- **“Total Factor Productivity”** (TFP), the residual growth – unexplained by increases in labour and capital employed or by increases in labour and capital productivity – is often used as a measure of “technological progress”. TFP could also arise because of “organizational progress” (better use of technological innovations)
- Per-capita growth will cease in the absence of continuous improvements in technology
- **In the long run the economy will converge towards a steady state rate of growth, which depends only on the rate of labour force growth and on the (exogenously given) rate of technological progress**

# The business cycle


- An economy organized on free-enterprise principles is subject to economy-wide fluctuations in production, trade and economic activity. These fluctuations occur around a long term growth trend and give rise to what is commonly called a “**business cycle**”
- Nineteen's century economist were very aware of business cycles
- According to Schumpeter a business cycle has 4 stages:
  - **Expansion** (increase in production, income, prices, generally low real interest rates)
  - **Crisis** (financial markets crashes and multiple bankruptcies)
  - **Recession** (drop in production, income, prices and generally high real interest rates)
  - **Recovery** (increase in productivity, consumer confidence, aggregate demand)

# The business cycle

- **Schumpeter classified business cycles according to their periodicity:**

- (Kitchin) inventory cycle of 3-4 years
- (Juglar) fixed investment cycle of 7-8 years
- (Kuznets) infrastructural investment cycle of 15-25 years
- (Kondratiev) wave or long technological cycle of 45-60 years

These different business cycles can build on each other, increasing or dampening the fluctuations of economic activity




P: prosperity  
R: recession  
D: depression  
E: improvement

# The business cycle

MACROECONOMICS FOCUSES ON THE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CYCLICAL VARIATIONS IN THE RATE OF GROWTH OF NATIONAL INCOME RELATIVE TO ITS LONG TERM RATE OF GROWTH

- Why do business cycles take place?
- What are the causes of business cycles?



# The theory of business cycles: Classical theory

Say's Law: "Products are paid for with products"

**"Supply creates its own demand"**

"The production of commodities creates, and is the one and universal cause which creates, a market for the commodities produced"

According to classical economic theory – mainstream until 1930 – **economic cycles are caused by exogenous influences** ("shocks") due to natural causes, wars, technology changes, "market failures" like monopolies (business or labour union) **or distortive government intervention**

Left by itself **the economy is self-regulating** and **full employment is the natural state of things**: when wages are too high (in real terms) the economy will contract. The contraction in the economy will induce a rise in unemployment that will cause a drop in (real) wages. As wages fall, the entrepreneur will start to hire again and the cycle begins anew

Markets can be temporarily disrupted by "external" events but are self-regulating, fundamentally resilient and their collective wisdom is always right: **the prices of assets bought and sold in the markets accurately reflect all known information** (Efficient Market Hypothesis), therefore they are always accurate and justified (any future price change depends on "unknowns")

# The theory of business cycles: **Keynesian theory**

- **The determinants of employment levels (and output) is aggregate demand.** If wages are cut or workers fired, aggregate demand will falter and this will lead to cut in investment. Likewise, consumers – faced with uncertainty about their future incomes - will save more and spend less, further dampening demand (“the paradox of thrift”). Lower demand will lead to further cuts in investments
- In this self-fulfilling cycle, **the economy can enter in multiple “underemployment equilibria”**, in which, as demand falls below supply of goods, prices fall and we experience deflation
- **Solution:** Government should step in and create demand, thus reviving the “animal spirits” of capitalism

# The theory of business cycles: Monetarist theory

- **Instability within any economy can be explained by fluctuations in the money supply**

$$MV = PY$$

M= Money Supply, determined by Central Bank

Y = real GDP, not influenced by monetary policy

P = price level

V = velocity of circulation of money,  $[V = f(\dots)]$ , V is a function of several factors, but is considered constant in “normal” circumstances in the short term]

PY = nominal GDP

- **Rational expectations:** since economic agents are rational they will discount attempt to “fool” them by their monetary authorities / governments:
  - **Lucas’ critique to the Phillips curve** – inefficacy of monetary policy
  - **Ricardian equivalence for debt financed government spending** – inefficacy of debt financed fiscal policy

# The theory of business cycles: Real Business Cycle (RBC) Theory

- **The RBC theory (Kydland & Prescott, 1982) explains business cycle fluctuations by real (in contrast to nominal) shocks**
- As in classical business cycle theory, business cycles do not represent a failure of markets to clear but rather they reflect the most efficient possible operation of the economy, given the structure of the economy
- **RBC theory sees recessions and periods of economic growth as the efficient response to exogenous changes in the real economic environment** (such as technology shocks directly changing the effectiveness of capital and/or labour)
- The basic RBC model predicts that given a temporary positive shock, output, consumption, investment and labour all rise above their long-term trends and hence formulate into a positive deviation. Furthermore, since more investment means more capital is available for the future, a short-lived shock may have an impact in the future. That is, above-trend behaviour may persist for some time even after the shock disappears. This capital accumulation is often referred to as an internal “propagation mechanism”, since it may increase the persistence of shocks to output. It is easy to see that a string of such productivity shocks will likely result in a boom. Similarly, recessions follow a string of bad shocks to the economy. If there were no shocks, the economy would just continue following the growth trend with no business cycles.
- The level of national output necessarily maximizes expected utility (individuals and firms respond optimally all the time) and government should therefore concentrate on long-run structural policy changes and not intervene through discretionary fiscal or monetary policy designed to actively smooth out economic short-term fluctuations.

# The theory of business cycles: Fisher – Minsky theory

1. **Inflation** depends on **growth of money**
  2. **Asset bubbles** (and crashes) depend on **growth of** (decline in) **credit**
- **Instability** is an inherent and inescapable flaw of capitalism because it originates in the very financial institutions that make capitalism possible
  - The financial system necessary for capitalist vitality and vigour – which translates entrepreneurial spirits into effective demand for investment – contains the potential for runaway expansion, powered by an investment boom. This runaway expansion can readily grind to a halt because accumulated financial changes render the financial system fragile
  - **Paradox:** Financial stability can be destabilizing (because it is extrapolated too far and induces investors to “overprice” / “overtrade” risky assets)

# The pro-cyclicality of credit

- **Supply of credit increases when economy is booming and decreases during economic slowdowns: a **pro-cyclical behaviour****
  - During booms:
    - Investors become optimistic and more eager to borrow
    - Lenders assessment of both the risk of individual investments and of systemic risk decline and are more eager to loan
- **Expansion of credit takes place through:**
  - Banking sectors (normally “heavily” regulated and “protected”)
  - “Shadow” banking system (non-bank lenders, normally lightly regulated)
- Expansion of credit results from development of “substitutes” to previous “traditional monies”. Examples:
  - Silver was substituted by “bills of exchange” (early 1800): facilitating international trade
  - Clearing House Certificates (around 1850): facilitating interbank transactions
  - Partly paid Stocks (UK, 1847), “Reportage” (France, 1882) and call money loans (US, 1920): facilitating leverage
  - CDs, Eurodollar, Money Markets funds (after 1950) : bypassing “ceilings on interest” rules
  - Derivatives and Securitization (after 1980): facilitating leverage and risk spreading
- **Expansion of credit is a systematic development due to efforts to reduce transaction costs and holding of liquidity and money balances**
- **History of money is a story of continuing innovations so that the existing supply of money can be used more efficiently and of developments of close substitutes for traditional money in order to circumvent formal requirements applied to money**

# The debt-deflation cycle

- A decline in prices of assets and commodities leads to a reduction in the value of collateral and induces banks to call loans or refuse new ones; therefore firms sell inventories and households sell securities/assets. This behaviour, whilst rational from the point of view of each individual agent, can lead to a “**debt-deflation spiral**” as prices fall still further (Irving Fisher)
- If agents are leveraged (normally they are highly leveraged at the top of a cycle) the decline in prices leads to bankruptcies, forcing liquidation of assets “at any price”, thus further lowering the value of loan collateral of even solvent debtor and bringing everyone closer to default
- Defaults of firms and households mean that banks incur losses and fear spreads that some of them may become insolvent
- The credit system suddenly freezes: banks stop lending to each other and keep large “precautionary” balances at the Central Bank. Liquidity freezes and even very “basic” lending, like trade finance, suddenly stops, with negative impact on “real” activity
- Any amount of Money provided by the Central Bank to the credit system is hoarded, therefore **money supply and credit to the economy falls** (the “velocity” of money,  $V$ , declines): to avoid falling in a “liquidity trap” Central Banks flood the system with liquidity “(dropping money from a helicopter)” and embark in various forms of “Quantitative Easing” (QE)
- **The debate between monetarists and Keynesians ignores the instability of credit and the fragility of the banking system**, the negative impacts on production and prices when the credit system becomes paralyzed by defaults caused by price declines: both school of thought take the well functioning of the “financial plumbing” of the economy for granted, which we see its never the case during a crisis

# Minsky three-part taxonomy of borrowers

Based on the relation between operating income and debt service payments of individual borrowers:

1. **Hedge Finance** (HF): Anticipated operating income is more than sufficient to pay both interest and scheduled reduction in debt – Low Risk: only big economic crisis can hit operating income
  2. **Speculative Finance** (SF): : Anticipated operating income is sufficient to pay interest but not to repay debt, that must be rolled over at maturity – Risk: “sudden stop”, i.e. when lender refuse to renew loans
  3. **Ponzi Finance** (PF) : Anticipated operating income is insufficient even to pay just the interest on debt - Very High Risk: Borrowers can meet their commitment to pay the (generally high) interest rates on their outstanding loans only if they obtain cash from new loans or if they manage to sell some assets (which means that they must rely on ever increasing asset prices)
    - During a boom the “quality” of debt decreases and the “fragility” of the credit structure (and of the financial system) increases – more is lent to SF & PF borrowers
    - During a crash more SF becomes PF and even some HF might become SF
- **If economic agents are “rational” why do business cycles occur?**

# Risk vs Uncertainty

- **Risk** is when the probability distribution of future states of the world (or of future market risk-returns) is known by agents. Risk can be calculated, securitized (that is “sliced” and “repackaged”), priced and hedged
- **Uncertainty** is when agents are not able to form priors on the distribution of future outcomes (Knight, 1921)
- **Rational Expectation Hypothesis** (REH; Muth, 1961) assumes that information collection is close to costless and that agents have cognitive faculties sufficient to weight probabilistically all future outcomes. Therefore markets are “efficient”, in the sense that all public information is immediately and accurately incorporated into the asset, leaving no room for systematic forecasting errors
- In its strongest version, REH and efficient markets hypothesis assumed a stable structural model whose structure is known by all agents. More realistic hypothesis allow agents to rationally learn about evolving economic structures. This learning process over time could explain apparently biased expectations (i.e. predictable forecast errors) in empirical data
- In an **uncertain** environment, where statistical probabilities are unknown, this very detailed approach to model the economy may no longer be suitable
- Herbert Simon, the father of **decision making under uncertainty**, believed human behaviour in complex environments followed **simple behavioural rules**, that he called “**heuristics**”- that is simple rules of thumb or mental shortcuts that over time have evolved to help us select subsets of information that are believed to be the most relevant

# Behavioural Economics and Finance

- Kahneman & Tversky (1974), the fathers of **behavioural economics**, used heuristics as means of explaining violations of the REH axioms
- “**Econs**” are fully rational beings capable of performing very complex calculations with all available information; “**Humans**” often exhibit “**bounded rationality**” – rationality that is limited by their cognitive resources and observational powers
- Experimental studies have revealed systematic biases in people’s judgements as well as systematic deviations from the preferences implied by the REH
- **Main biases:**
  - Heuristic Simplifications:
    - Availability – ease of access or recall information/narratives
    - Representativeness/Extrapolation – relying on stereotypes rather than on cold statistical analysis, thus ignoring information like sample size or “base rate”, randomness or reversal to the mean
    - Conservatism, i.e underweighting of new evidence/anchoring, regret aversion
    - Framing: narrow framing (ignoring correlations effects), disposition effect (selling winners too early, holding on to losers, house money effect (taking more risk after a big win)
  - Self Deception (overconfidence and limits to learning):
    - Overconfidence / overoptimism : feeling above average
    - Biased self attribution / confirmation bias / hindsight bias

# Arbitrage

Why do rational traders not take advantage of mispricing due to the behavioural biases described above, as postulated by Milton Friedman (1954)?

- **Arbitrage is both risky and costly**, so not always it can counter the impact of “irrational” (noise) traders
- **Arbitrage is riskless only in the extreme case of perfect substitutability and frictionless markets.** In real life “imperfect hedges” can move against the arbitrageur (“noise risk”) and force him to sell at a loss, especially if he is leveraged (and even more so if many leveraged arbitrageurs have similar positions)
- This situation is exacerbated when there is a **principal-agent problem**, as is the case for institutions managing other people money, **where principal and agent can have very different time-horizons**
- This is particularly true for “macro”-inefficiencies (like market bubbles) without good asset substitutes, for which therefore it is not possible to hedge risk in arbitrage: arbitraging market-level mispricing becomes risky and unattractive
- Abundant risk capital, flush liquidity and easy access to leverage may reduce micro-inefficiencies (Samuelson) but boost macro inefficiencies in a Minskyian sense

# Manias, Panics and Crashes

“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”  
Tolstoy, Anna Karenina

- **No matter how different the latest financial frenzy or crisis appears, there are usually remarkable similarities with past experience from other countries and from history**
- Manias are associated with economic euphoria; corporates and households (and sometimes even governments) become increasingly upbeat, investment spending and/or consumption spending surges because credit is plentiful
- During these euphoric periods an increasing number of investors seek short term capital gains from increases in asset prices rather than from the investment income based on the productive use of these assets. Banks lend freely, generally against those same assets that are increasingly becoming overpriced
- Bubbles in prices of any asset – be it real assets, like housing or real estate, natural resources or precious metals, and even tulip bulbs or financial assets, like stocks, bonds or currencies – always implode: by definition a bubble involves a non-sustainable pattern of price changes or cash flows

# Manias, Panics and Crashes: **international propagation**


Historically both euphoria and panic have spread from one country to others, through several different channels:

- **GDP increases/decreases** in one country induces increases/decreases in demand for imports and hence increases/decreases exports (and GDP) in other countries
- **Capital flows** (followed by “sudden stops”), that lead to increases/decreases in the value of the currency and in prices of the assets in the receiving country
- **Increases/decreases in credit** in one country spill over in other countries, given the global interconnections in the banking and financial sectors (incl. financial innovation)

# Development of Manias, Panics and Crashes

- **Most crisis begin with a bubble**, in which the price of a particular asset rises far above its underlying fundamental value. Major technological innovation (railroads, internet, etc.) and changes in trade patterns (globalization) lead to expectations of high growth and even higher returns, sufficient to foster a self-fulfilling rise in the asset's price
- The bubble goes hand in hand with **excessive accumulation of debt**, as investors borrow money to buy into the boom
- Asset bubbles are often associated with an **excessive growth in the supply of credit**, a consequence of:
  - Financial Innovation
  - Loose monetary policy of the Central Bank
  - Lax supervision and regulation of the financial system
- Assets at the heart of the bubble typically serve as collateral and the value of collateral is rising, more can be borrowed and thus **leverage keeps growing**
- However unsustainable, this debt-financed consumption or investment has real economic effects: household and firms purchasing goods and services fuel economic growth (and a “this time is different” feeling)
- When the prices of bubbly assets stop rising, the **boom turns into bust**, triggering panicked “**margin calls**” (borrowers have to put up more cash/collateral to compensate for falling prices) and starting a vicious circle of fire sales and price collapses
- **Crises are not “Black Swans” but “White Swans”**, with remarkably predictable elements of boom and bust (as illustrated in Reinhart-Rogoff “This time is Different”)

# The Phases of a Financial Crisis



# Business Cycles & Financial Crisis: the three key elements

Business cycles leading to financial crisis are characterized by three elements:

1. **Changes in trade patterns**, due to:
  - New entrant(s) in the world markets (typically exploiting a “comparative advantage”) [in the past: end of wars]
  - Lowering of trade tariffs
  - Change in terms of trade
2. **Technological innovation(s)**
3. Credit growth/unsustainable **increase in leverage**, often accompanied by **financial liberalization/innovation**

# Business Cycles & Financial Crisis: a stylized description

- **Changes in trade patterns and technological innovations** represent a shock to the macroeconomic system and economic agents will anticipate improvement of profit opportunities in some sector/countries or even in the overall profit/GDP share.
- The rate of economic starts to accelerate, feeding further optimism
- Corporation, households and investors **borrow to take advantage of the improved profit opportunities**; government usually will borrow to help those “left behind” by these transformations (or facilitate borrowing by these “weak”/”un-creditworthy” constituencies, like most recently sub-prime borrowers in US)
- The boom is fuelled by **expansion of credit** by the traditional banking sector or, through financial innovation, by new unregulated intermediaries (“shadow banks”) via new financial instruments
- Soros claims that financial markets can validate a given trend by influencing not only market prices but also the fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect (**Reflexivity theory**: the feedback loop between market participants’ understanding of economy and economy itself)

# History does not repeat itself but it often rhymes

- “The charm of history and its enigmatic lesson consist in the fact that, from age to age, nothing changes yet everything is completely different” (Aldous Huxley)
- “Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity” (Seneca)
- “Knowing is the beginning of action; action is the completion of knowledge” (Wang Yangming)

# History of financial crisis

Year	Countries	New Trade/other events	New Tech	Fin Innovation
1636-37	Holland	Trade with India; end of war with Spain	Tulip bulbs	Vendor financing, gold inflows from Spain
1720	England, France	Trade with Americas	Lower transport costs	South Sea & Mississippi Co Stocks
1772	Britain, Holland	Trade with India, exp. commodities; end of 7 years war	Housing, turnpikes, canals	Country banks, Bills of Exchange
1810/1815/ 1819/ 1825-26	Britain	Trade with Americas, end of Napoleonic war	Canals, cotton, mines	Banks, bonds sold in instalment, Exchequer Bills, Default of all Newly Independent Latam countries

# History of financial crisis

Year	Countries	New Trade/other events	New Tech	Fin Innovation
1836 /1837 /1838	Britain, US, France	Trade with US	Railways, cotton land, cotton, building sites	Joint-stock / wildcat / regional banks
1847 / 1848	Britain, Continental Europe	Trade with US, wheat and potato harvest failure	Railways	Partly paid railways securities
1857	US, Britain, Continental Europe	Trade with US	Railways, wheat, new agricultural land, steamships	Gold discoveries, clearinghouse, banks M&A, new banks
1866	Britain, Italy	Trade with Europe	Cotton, Shipping companies	Joint-stock discount houses

# History of financial crisis

Year	Countries	New Trade/other events	New Tech	Fin Innovation
1873	Germany/Austria, United States	Trade with US; Franco-Prussian indemnity	Buildings, Railways, shipping, Suez Canal	New industrial & construction banks, capital inflows from Europe
1882	France	Trade with SE Europe	Lower transport costs	Securities bought on margin
1890	Britain (Baring)	Trade with S. America & S. Africa	Electricity, commodities	Argentine sec, Private co going public
1907	US, France/Italy	Boom in world trade	New industries	Banks making investments in industries, Trust Co.

# History of financial crisis

Year	Countries	New Trade/other events	New Tech	Fin Innovation
1920-21	Britain, US	Post war trade boom	New industries	Reparation & War Debts
1929-39	World	End of gold standard, speculation on land, commodities & stocks	New industrial organization	Assets bought on margin, international capital flows
1960-70	World	Europe and Japan post WW2 recovery	Chemical and other new industries Military tech	Eurodollar market
1974-5	World	OPEC, other Emerging countries, spec on commodities	Electronics, IT, drugs	Floating exchange rates, "fiat" money

# History of financial crisis

Year	Countries	New Trade/other events	New Tech	Fin Innovation
1979-82	World (exp. LatAM)	Spec on Commodities, Trade with South America and OPEC, US farmland, real estate	Electronics, chemicals, IT,	Syndicated bank loans, mortgage loans (MBS)
1982-87-92/ 1990	US / Japan	Trade with Europe, Japan, NIA (HK, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea)	Outsourcing, IT	Derivatives, new financial instruments (cum warrant bonds, zero coupon bond, "junk" bond)
1994	Mexico	NAFTA	Outsourcing	New Banks

# History of financial crisis

Year	Countries	New Trade/other events	New Tech	Fin Innovation
1997-98	South East Asia, Russia, Emerging Markets	WTO, speculation on land & stocks in EM	Outsourcing	Easier international capital flows
2000-1	US	Speculation on Stocks	Internet	
2007-	World	China, other EM, speculation on commodity & on housing	Internet, outsourcing, just-in-time inventories	ABS, CDO, CDS, SPV, etc.
2010-	Europe	China, other EM, speculation on commodities	Outsourcing, just-in-time inventories	euro

# This time is different

**Highly leveraged economies are always fragile and vulnerable to crisis of confidence, but**

**“This time is different”**

“Financial crisis are things that happen to other people, in other countries at other times: we have learned from past mistakes and the current boom, unlike many booms that precede catastrophic collapses in the past, is built on sound fundamentals, structural reforms, technological innovation and good policy”

Some examples:

- Latin American Debt Crisis of 1980s:
  - Why this time is different? Commodity prices are strong, interest rates are low, oil money is being “recycled”, there are skilled technocrats in government, money is being used for high- return infrastructure investments and bank loans are being made instead of bond loans, as in the interwar period of 1920s and 1930s. With individual banks taking up large blocks of loans, there will be incentive for information gathering and monitoring to ensure that money are well spent and the loans repaid
  - Outcome: Steeply higher real interest rates (forced by Fed Chairman Volker to curb US inflation) combined with a collapse of global commodity prices led to the default of Mexico in August 1983, followed by over a dozen of other EM countries. It took almost a decade to recover
- Asian Debt Crisis of end of 1990s:
  - Why this time is different? The region has a conservative fiscal policy, stable exchange rates, high rates of growth and savings, and no remembered history of financial crisis
  - Outcome: Overinvestment and break-up of dollar peg
- The Great Contraction of 2007-:
  - Everything is fine because of globalization, the technology boom, a better understanding of monetary policy and a superior financial system capable of allocating risks to those agents better equipped to carry them, thanks to securitization

# The aftermath of severe financial crises

**Severe financial crisis** are protracted affairs, whose aftermath is characterized by:

**1. Deep and prolonged collapses in assets markets:**

- Declines in real housing prices average 35% over 6 years
- Declines in equity prices average 56% over about 3 ½ years

**2. Profound declines in output and employment:**

- Unemployment rate rises on average 7 percentage points during the down phase of the cycle, which lasts on average more than 4 years
- Output falls (from peak to trough) more than 9% on average, although the downturn, average ca. 2y, is considerably shorter than for unemployment\*

**3. Value of government debt tends to explode:** on average it rises by 86% (in real terms, relative to pre-crisis levels\*\*)

\* Presumably this is partly because potential GDP growth is positive and we are measuring only absolute changes in income and not gaps relative to potential output. Even so, recessions surrounding financial crises are usually long compared to normal recessions, which typically last less than a year

\*\* The main cause of debt explosions is not the widely cited costs of bailing out and recapitalizing the banking system: bailout cost are difficult to measure (the divergence among estimates from competing studies is considerable), but even upper-bound estimates pale next to actual measured increases in public debt. The biggest driver of debt increases is the inevitable collapse in tax revenues that governments suffer in the wake of deep and prolonged output contraction. Automatic stabilizers and countercyclical fiscal policy efforts contribute to the debt buildup. Finally, if interest rates soar following a financial crisis, a spike in interest burden on debt further raises the outstanding debt amount

# How to deal with the aftermath of a crash

## In the long run:

- Everyone – households, corporations, governments, banks, other financial market players – must **reduce their level of debt**
- If private leverage is not reduced, banks, firms and households will be unable to lend, invest, consume and growth will be impaired (“Zombie” banks, firms and consumers have kept the Japanese economy from recovering since the 1990 crisis)
- **Insolvent banks, firms and households must be allowed to go bankrupt** in a necessary, though painful process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter)
- If public leverage is not reduced, the impulse will be to get rid of these debts by inflating the currency (internal inflation and external devaluation)
- **Imbalances in trade and public finance should be addressed in a “structural” way**

# How to deal with the aftermath of a crash

**In the short run** (both during and immediately after a crash):

- Governments with available resources should step in to **break the vicious circle of falling asset prices, falling private demand and falling private investments**
- Central Banks should step in to **provide liquidity to the banking sector and to financial markets**
- Governments and Central Banks should intervene to **deal with insolvent banks and other financial market institutions**
- Care should be applied in withdrawing public support (too soon can risk igniting another crisis)
- The issue is how to deal with “**moral hazard**” ( = the willingness to take excessive risks knowing that the government – hence the taxpayer – will bail out and shoulder whatever negative consequences follow)

# Suggested Readings

- Charles P. Kindleberger, Robert Z. Aliber: Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Fifth Edition, Palgrave 2005, Chapters 1, 2, 7, 8
- Nouriel Roubini, Steven Mihm: Crisis Economics, Penguin Books, 2011, Chapter 1, 2
- Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff: This Time is Different: Eight centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, 2009, Chapter 14